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PERSONAL INJURIES TO THE TENANT; THE
LANDLORD'S LIABILITY IN TORT THEREFOR
HISTORY
At early common law a lessee was regarded as having
merely a personal right against the lessor and his heirs, and
no property rights in the land accrued to him.1 But as a re-
sult of the several remedies that were created in his favor,
and especially as a result of the writ ejectione firmae (from
which we have the modern action in ejectment), whereby a
tenant could protect and defend his possession of the prop-
erty against all the world, the law came to regard him as
having rights in rem.2 Thus his interest became a proprietary
interest which he could enforce against any wrongdoer. This
so well established the property conception of the lessee's in-
terest that a lease came to be regarded as a sale of the de-
mised premises for a term.3 The rule of caveat emptor ap-
plied and accordingly the landlord was subject to no liability
for leasing premises that were in a dangerously defective
condition ;4 consequently the lessee was left to determine for
himself the condition of the premises before making the
lease.5 As a result of this sale concept, the landlord was con-
sidered to have surrendered both possession and control and
he was not permitted to enter the premises without the con-
sent of the tenant.6 Accordingly, the courts imposed no duty
on the lessor to keep the premises in repair once the tenant
had entered into possession.7 The theory, undoubtedly, be-
hind this early common law rule was that the landlord need
not rent, and the prospective tenant was free to take or leave
a proposed rental. If he took it he accepted all the disclosed
1. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, p. 106 et seq.
2. DIGBY, HISTORY OF REAL PROPERTY, 4th ed. p. 176.
3. Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 58, 62 (1809). The New York court said
the leasing of land was "like the sale of specific personal property to be
delivered." Church, C. J., in Becar v. Flues, 64 N. Y. 518 (1876).
4. Daulton v. Williams, 81 Cal. App. 2d 70, 183 P. 2d 325 (1947);
Rotte v. Meierjohan, 78 Ohio App. 387, 70 N. E. 2d 684 (1946).
5. Cower v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363 (1887). An injured visitor,
consequently, had recourse only against the occupier of the land. Bouy
v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 338 Pa. 5, 12 A. 2d 7 (1940).
6. See 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT 7 (1910).
7. Phelan v. Fitzpatrick, 188 Mass. 237, 74 N. E. 326 (1905); Ward
v. Fagin, 101 Mo. 669, 14 S. W. 738 (1890).
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terms including the condition of the premises,s or as one
English judge so succinctly put it "[F]raud apart, there is no
law against letting a tumble-down house." 9 But couple this
with the statement by Rolfe, C. J. in Winterbottom v.
Wright :10
This is one of those unfortunate cases in which there cer-
tainly has been damnum, but it is damnum absque in-
juria; it is no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be
without a remedy, but by that consideration we ought not
to be influenced. Hard cases, it has been frequently ob-
served, are apt to introduce bad law.
This gives one a somewhat keener insight into the singu-
larly harsh conception of the English common law which
came to pervade the rules surrounding the landlord-tenant
relationship.
The courts eventually began to recognize, however, the
desirability of shifting the burden of repair upon the lessor
in a number of situations and various exceptions thus became
engrafted upon the common law rules." One of the first of
these exceptions was when liability was imposed in favor of
the public in cases involving wharves and piers;12 later it
was extended where the premises were leased for such pur-
poses as hotels'13 and stores.14
None of the court-drawn exceptions, however, imposed upon
the landlord the duty of repairing ordinary leased premises.
Here, the common law rule placing the burden of repair upon
the tenant was retained. 15 Whereas in most of the above ex-
ceptions the court satisfied the common law theories by dis-
covering some measure of control by the landlord that would
justify shifting the burden of repair upon him, in the repair
of ordinary leased premises the measure of control sufficient
to satisfy the court seemed to be lacking, and the rule was
8. See James, Tort Risks of Land Ownership, 28 CONN. B. J. 128
(1954).
9. Erle, C. J., in Robbins v. Jones, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 221, 240, 143 Eng.
Rep. 768 (1863).
10. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402
(1842).
11. See Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord, 26 MIcn. L. REv. 260.
Note, 62 HAntv. L. REv. 669 (1949).
12. Swords v. Edgar, 50 N. Y. 28 (1874). Judge J. Henry Johnson
notes this in Timmons v. Wood Products Corp., 164 S. C. 361, 162 S. E.
329. See note 83 Post.
13. Copley v. Balle, 9 Kan. App. 465, 60 Pac. 656 (1900).
14. Turner v. Kent, 134 Kan. 574, 7 P. 2d 513 (1932).
15. Rotte v. Meierjohan, 78 Ohio App. 387, 7 N. E. 2d 684 (1946).
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retained as hereinbefore stated. It failed, however, to har-
monize with the social and economic conditions of the late 19th
and early 20th centuries, for it was becoming increasingly
apparent that the lessor was best able to exercise a long term
supervision over conditions needing repair and, of most im-
portance, was in the economic position most suited for the
burden. In Fifty Years of Torts,16 Mr. Bohien states:
It is a notorious fact that those whose slender incomes
force them to rent dilapidated buildings are rarely, if
ever, in such a financial position as to make it possible to
expect them to make repairs, the repairs necessary to
safe occupancy. Therefore, if those who came into such
buildings as members of the tenant's household or other-
wise are to be protected from injury and to be given a
chance of compensation if they are injured, "it is obvi-
ous", as Justice Holmes said, "that the safety of the
building must be left mainly to the lessor."
For the most part this gradual exodus from the common
law was accomplished by statute,1 the consensus no doubt
being in accordance with that of Mr. Bohlen stated above.
In some cases, however, the courts have determined to
dispel the harshness of the common law. In Thompson v.
Clemens,'8 the Maryland Court, although affirming a find-
ing for defendant because of insufficient evidence as to the
negligence of the landlord, held that a failure to repair by
a landlord, when he should have known that the defect com-
plained of by his tenant was likely to result in an injury,
gave rise to a cause of action sounding in tort for his negli-
gent failure to repair.
This significant revising into a tort liability of that which
previously had been regarded as a contractual duty, was the
basis for a minority stand that was subsequently to find ad-
herents so numerous that "(it) now seems improper to say
that it is the majority rule that the landlord is not liable for
personal injuries, for it is doubtful whether a majority of
the courts adhere unqualifiedly to this view... ,,"9
Whether majority or minority, the courts holding the land-
lord liable in tort for injuries to his tenant have proceeded
16. 50 HARvARD L. REv. 725 at 746 (1937).
17. 17 A. L. R. 2d 704 (1951).
18. 96 Md. 196, 53 AtI. 919 (1903).
19. 163 A. L. R. 300 (1946).
1958]
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to do so under certain exceptions which may be briefly classi-
fied into the following:
1. Fraudulent concealment by the landlord at the time of
leasing;
2. "Misfeasance" (rather than "non-feasance"), in making
repairs;
3. Negligence of the landlord as to the condition of prem-
ises within his control; and
4. The lessor's failure to perform his agreement to repair.20
When added to any statutorily imposed duty to repair, the
aforementioned classifications appear to cover effectively the
liabilities in fact imposed upon the owner of land insofar as
his tenant is concerned.
The writer will briefly discuss these main classifications
and will conclude with a review of the South Carolina law
applicable to the general topic.
DUTY IMPOSED BY STATUTE
The statutory duty to repair affords varied coverage -
from certain types of tenements to a duty to repair all build-
ings whatsoever. Generally, however, these statutes can be di-
vided into three types.
California, Type Statutes - This type, first adopted by
California in 187221 and subsequently by Montana, North Da-
kota, Oklahoma and South Dakota,22 requires that the lessor
of a building intended for occupation by human beings must,
in the absence of agreement to the contrary, place the prem-
ises in a condition fit for occupation, and must repair any
and all subsequent dilapidations. Under these statutes the
landlord is entitled to notice by the tenant of any defects23
and is excused from making repairs necessitated by the ten-
ant's want of ordinary care.
20. In his treatise TiiE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY sec. 238 at p. 252,
Professor Powell lists another classification in which, conceivably, there
are cases where the lessee seeks recoupment from the lessor for liabilities
theretofore imposed on the lessee by other claimants. "Such recoupment
is theoretically possible but has not been granted in any case found by
the author." Id. at p. 263.
See Dick v. Sunbright Steam Laundry, 307 N. Y. 422, 121 N. E. 2d
399 (1954), which held that the lessee could not compel contribution or
indemnification by the lessor, because the lessor is not liable in tort
under a covenant to repair.
21. CAL. CIV. CODE sees. 1941, 1942 (1949).
22. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. sees. 42-201, 42-203 (1947); N. D. REv.
CODE secs 47-6212, 47-1613 (1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, sees. 31, 32
(1941) ; S. D. CODE sees. 38.0409, 38.0410 (1939).
23. Tatum v. Thompson, 86 Cal. 203, 24 Pac. 1009 (1890).
[Vol. 10
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol10/iss2/6
LAW NOTES
The tenant has two remedies under the California Statute
if the landlord fails to repair after being given notice so to
do. Either the tenant may vacate the premises, in which case
he is discharged from further payment of rent, or he may re,
pair the defects himself and deduct the cost from the rent,
provided such cost does not exceed the rental amount for one
month.
The language of this California Statute indicated that it
was to apply to any building "intended for use of human
beings," but the courts early restricted it to dwelling houses
and excluded from its coverage stores, factories, or business
premises.24 Earlier, it had been held that the dilapidations
must have occurred after the beginning of the term and be
such as to render the premises untenantable. 2  On its face,
however, the statute had made no such restrictions.
The early decisions construing the statutes also negatived
any civil action for damages being brought by the tenant. Only
those remedies specifically granted by the statutes were avail-
able to the injured party.26
New York Type Statutes - During the period surrounding
the first World War, several states passed Housing Codes or
Tenement Housing Laws which elaborately attempted to con-
trol construction, maintenance, repair, safety, and other simi-
lar matters. Some states limited these provisions to tene-
ment houses, 27 while the New York Legislature has extended
coverage to multiple dwelling houses. 28 In at least two,
states, 29 the statutes applied to all dwellings.
This second group of statutes was construed much more
broadly than were the California Type Statutes. New York
cases, for instance, have held that every part of a multiple
24. Wall Estate Co. v. Standard Box Co., 20 Cal. App. 311, 128 Pac.
1020 (1912).
25. Dwyer v. Carroll, 86 Cal. 298, 24 Pac. 1015 (1890).
26. Van Every v. Ogg, 59 Cal. 563 (1881). See also the collection of
cases in Annot., 17 A. L. R. 2d 704 (1951).
27. CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. secs. 4050, 4054 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT.
secs. 101.170, 101.990 (1948); MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 144, secs. 66, 89
(1932); Wis. STATS. 1947, sees. 101.06, 101.28 (applied to factories,
stores and tenement houses).
28. N. Y. MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW see. 782 (1946).
29. IOWA CODE secs. 413.66, 413.108 (1946); MicE. STAT. ANN. sees.
5.2843, 5.2873 (Henderson 1936), which states at sec. 5.2843 that: "Every
dwelling and all parts thereof shall be kept in good repair by the owner.
The roof shall be kept as not to leak and the rainwater shall be so
drained and conveyed therefrom as not to cause dampness in the walls
or ceilings."
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dwelling must be kept in good repair,30 and this includes fau-
cets,31 windows,3 2 and even gas ranges.3
Is there then to be civil liability imposed upon the lessor who
violates these repair statutes? One view is that if the legis-
lature has omitted a private remedy in behalf of the lessee,
then it cannot be treated as accidental; it must be regarded
as an indicia of intent upon the part of the legislature that no
remedy shall be permitted.3 4 But, it is argued, the omission of
a private remedy is not conclusive; it is as reasonable to con-
clude that the problem was not considered by the legislature
and therefore they had no such intent at all.3 5 In Altz v. Lie-
berson,36 Judge Cardozo said:
A "tenement house," as the meaning is enlarged by the
definition of the statute may include the dwellings of the
rich. In its primary and common application it suggests
the dwellings of the poor .... We may be sure that the
framers of this statute when regulating tenement life,
had uppermost in thought the care of those who are un-
able to care for themselves. The legislature must have
known that unless repairs in the rooms of the poor were
made by the landlord, they would not be made by anyone.
The duty imposed became commensurate with the need.
The right to seek redress is not limited to the city or its
officials. The right extends to all whom there was a pur-
pose to protect.8 7
Thus the landlords found that a state of disrepair could
impose tort liability for injuries resulting from such dis-
repair, and the New York Statute thus acquired what is best
termed "real teeth." In fairness, the courts have confined
this duty to cases wherein the lessor is shown to have had
either actual or constructive notice of the need for repair.
38
30. Wechsler v. United Produce, 126 Misc. 563, 214 N. Y. S. 136
(1926).
31. Tucker v. Wagner, 132 Misc. 402, 229 N. Y. S. 769 (1928).
32. Weiss v. Walloch, 256 App. Div. 354, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 69 (1939), re-
,argument denied, 256 App. Div. 1059, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 839 (1939). These
cases are discussed generally in Annot., 93 A. L. R. 778 (1934).
33. Goldkopf v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 149 Misc. 663, 268 N. Y. S.
126 (1933).
34. Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317,
331 (1914).
35. See Harkrider, op. cit. supra note 11, at 387.
36. 233 N. Y. 16, 134 N. E. 703 (1922).
37. Ibid. at 19, 134 N. E. at 705.
38. People v. Weil, 286 App. Div. 753, 146 N. Y. S. 2d 416 (1955);
Stem v. Zalaynick, 148 N. Y. S. 2d 493 (1956).
[Vol. 10
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The problem has long been a troublesome one, however, and
at least one New York Court has viewed with suspicion the
apparent departures from the common law and has strictly
construed the applicable New York Statute.39
Louisiana Type Statutes - This third type of legislation
specifically gives the tenant the right to sue in tort and has
been adopted in the states of Georgia and Louisiana."° The
statutes cover the repair of all buildings and its coverage is
generally held to extend not only to the tenant but to all per-
sons rightfully on the premises.41 It also eliminates the re-
quirement of knowledge by the lessor.42 The Louisiana Court
has, however, allowed the owner to contract away his liability
for injury to the lessee caused by any defect within the prem-
ises unless the owner knew or should have known of the de-
fects or had received notice thereof and failed to remedy it
within a reasonable time.
43
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF DEFECTS BY LANDLORD
With respect to this category, the Restatement of Torts
states:
A lessor of land, who conceals or fails to disclose to
his lessee any natural or artificial condition involving un-
reasonable risk of bodily harm to persons upon the land
is subject to liability for such harm caused thereby to
the lessee and others on the land with the consent of the
lessee or a sublessee after the lessee has taken posses-
sion, if
(a) the lessee does not know of the condition or the
risk involved therein, and
(b) the lessor knows of the condition and realizes the
risk involved therein and has reason to believe that the
lessee will not discover the condition or realize the risk.44
39. Wesseley v. Trustees of First German M. E. Church of N. Y., 165
Misc. 834, 300 N. Y. S. 942 (1938).
40. GA. CODE ANN. 1937, secs. 61-111, 61-112; LA. CIv. CODE ANN.
arts. 670, 2322, 2693, 2694, 2695 (1945). For discussion of the civil law
background of the Louisiana statutes see Note, 4 TuL. L. REv. 610
(1930).
41. Cf. Tucker v. Wagner, 132 Misc. 402, 229 N. Y. S. 769 (1928)
(wife); Klein v. Young, 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495 (1927) (roomer); Byrd
v. Spyro, 170 So. 384 (La. App. 1936) (mother-in-law).
42. Bates v. Blitz, 205 La. 536, 17 So. 2d 816 (1944).
43. Paul v. Nolen, 166 So. 509 (La. App. 1936). See also the dictum
in Poss v. Brown, 73 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 1954).
44. RESTATEMENT, TORTs sec. 358 (1934). The basis for this liability
was thus described by Chief Justice Holmes: "As the landlord makes no
7
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Only occasionally is the lessor held liable on this theory ;45
more commonly his liability is denied, either because it is not
shown that the lessor had knowledge of the defective condi-
tion ;46 or because the defective condition was in fact known
to the lessee 47 or because the required factor of "concealment"
was absent because the defect was of such an obvious char-
acter.
48
It seems some animadversion was implied when the theory
was rejected that the landlord should be held liable because
"he could have known, by the exercise of ordinary care and
caution" of an alleged latent defect.4 9
MISFEASANCE OF THE LANDLORD IN THE MAKING OF REPAIRS
If a lessor, whether bound to act or acting voluntarily,50
undertakes to make repairs, alterations or improvements in
the premises and the job is done carelessly with resultant in-
jury to the lessee, the lessor is liable for the damages to the
lessee. ; ' This extends to members of the lessee's family,52
contract concerning the condition of the premises at the time of leasing,
the only ground on which he can be held is that he unconscionably is
leading the other party into a trap." O'Malley v. Twenty-five Associates,
178 Mass. 555, 60 N. E. 387 (1901).
45. Robinson v. Tate, 34 Tenn. App. 215, 236 S. W. 2d 445 (1950)
(latent defect in a radiator which was not apparent to the lessee). The
theory has been extended to include liability for concealment of the fact
that the premises were infected with a contagious disease. See Earle v.
Kuklo, 26 N. J. Super. 471, 98 A. 2d 107 (1953).
46. Newman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 77 N. D. 466, 43 N. W. 2d 411
(1950) ; Luedtke v. Phillips, 190 Va. 207, 56 S. E. 2d 80 (1949).
47. Atlantic Terrace Co. v. Rosen, 56 So. 2d 444 (Fla., 1952).
48. Powell v. Stivers, 108 Cal. App. 2d 72, 238 P. 2d 34 (1951).
49. Hamilton v. Baugh, 335 Ill. App. 346, 82 N. E. 2d 196 (1948),
which concerned the defective condition of an outdoor privy. But see
Shuey v. Frierson, 193 Tenn. 318, 270 S. W. 2d 883 (1954).
50. The courts of Massachusetts have differentiated between repairs
made pursuant to a binding agreement and those made gratuitously.
Misfeasance in the former case imposes liability upon the lessor where"negligence" is shown, while misfeasance in the latter case imposes lia-
bility only on a finding of "gross negligence." Greenway Wood Heel Co.
v. John Shea Co., 313 Mass. 177, 46 N. E. 2d 746 (1943); Collins v.
Goodrich, 324 Mass. 251, 85 N. E. 2d 771 (1949).
51. RESTATEMENT, TORTs sec. 362 (1934); Nashua Gummed & Coated
Paper Co. v. Noyes Buick Co., 93 N. H. 348, 41 A. 2d 920 (1945) (in
the course of making repairs, fire was caused by the use of an acetylene
torch); Theakston v. Kaszak, 152 Pa. Super. 576, 33 A. 2d 46 (1943)
(imperfectly repaired bannister gave way); Vollum v. School Lane Apts.,
Inc., 380 Pa. 252, 110 A. 2d 251 (1955) (door being repaired in vesti-
bule of apartment house fell on tenant).
52. Shaw v. Butterworth, 327 Mo. 622, 38 S. W. 2d 57 (1931); Good
v. Van Hemert, 114 Minn. 393, 131 N. W. 466 (1911); Oglesby v. Rut-
ledge, 67 Ga. App. 656, 21 S. E. 2d 497 (1942).
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and others on the premises in his right.53 Misfeasance is the
theoretical basis of liability in these cases rather than non-
feasance and it has been held that the lessor incurs no lia-
bility under this rule when he falsely tells the lessee that he
has repaired the defect about which lessee has complained.
Such a case was considered one of nonfeasance by the Okla-
homa Court.54 The Restatement, however, takes the opposite
position.55
The main problems which arise in this type of case are
contributory negligence50 and the effect of the hiring of an
"independent contractor" by the lessor. The independent con-
tractor doctrine which insulates the contractee from liability
has been held to be inapplicable when the act creates a danger
which the lessor has a duty not to create,U when the lessor
owed a duty to the lessee which the contractor failed to per-
form in his behalf,58 or when the work done is itself a nui-
sance or necessarily operates to cause damage to the lessee. 9
NEGLIGENCE OF THE LANDLORD AS TO CONDITION OF PREMISES
WITHIN HIS CONTROL
There is a great body of authority with respect to this cate-
gory, namely, cases in which the lessor is claimed to be liable
to the lessee because of the lack of due care in his exercise
of retained control over part of the premises.60 Generally,
53. Ginsberg v. Wineman, 314 Mich. 1, 22 N. W. 2d 49 (1946) (plain-
tiff was an employee); Bloecher v. Duerbeck, 333 Mo. 359, 62 S. W. 2d
553 (1933) (plaintiff was a guest).
54. Wick v. Wasson, 193 Okla. 209, 142 P. 2d 124 (1943).
55. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs sec. 362, Comment b (1934).
56. Bartlett v. Taylor, 351 Mo. 1060, 174 S. W. 2d 844 (1943); Miller
v. Howard, 206 Md. 148, 110 A. 2d 683 (1955).
57. Bailey v. Zlotrick, 149 F. 2d 505 (D. C. Cir. 1945).
58. Glaude v. Nash, 46 A. 2d 542 (D. C. 1946).
59. Shapiro v. Vautier, 36 A. 2d 349 (D. C. 1944). There is dictum
that the doctrine is inapplicable when the injury results from the acts
of an independent contractor which acts were specifically authorized
by the lessor. Collins v. Goodrich, 324 Mass. 251, 85 N. E. 2d 771 (1949).
But see Newman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 77 N. D. 466, 43 N. W. 2d
411, where the court held the doctrine applicable and the lessor not liable.
60. The Restatement of Torts has two sections concerning this topic.
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs sec. 360 (1934): "A possessor of land, who
leases a part thereof and retains in his own possession any other part
which the lessee is entitled to use as appurtenant to the part leased to
him, is subject to liability to his lessee and others lawfully upon the land
with the consent of the lessee or a sub-lessee for bodily harm caused
to them by a dangerous condition upon that part of the land retained in
the lessor's control, if the lessor by the exercise of reasonable care could
have discovered the condition and the unreasonable risk involved therein
and could have made the condition safe."
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs sec. 361 (1934): "A possessor of land, who
leases a part thereof and retains in his own control any other part which
1958]
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his duty is restricted to the maintenance of as good conditions
as existed when the relationship of lessor-lessee began.61 But,
in extent, his retained control has been held to exist as to the
structure's roof,6 2 external walls,63 its hallways, stairways,
porches, etc., used by the lessee in common with other ten-
ants,64 its service systems (e. g., heat, water, gas, light, ele-
vator system, and the like), that are used in common by the
lessee with others,6 5 and its fire escapes. 6
The main problem besetting the courts is determining when
the lessor has in fact exercised due care. Some hold the lessor
not to be liable until he has knowledge of the defect, or is
charged with knowledge because of the lapse of time. 67 As
was stated before,68 Louisiana, by statute, has done away with
the requirement of knowledge by the lessor. Other courts
stress the lessor's duty to inspect, so as to keep familiar with
the condition of the premises as to which he has retained con-
trol. 0 Courts also differ as to what parts of the premises
the lessor can be said to have "retained control." Reserving
to the lessor the privilege of entering for inspection or for
the making of needed repairs was sufficient justification for
is necessary to the safe use of the leased part, is subject to liability to
his lessee and others lawfully upon the land with the consent of the lessee
or a sub-lessee for bodily harm caused to them by a dangerous condition
upon that part of the land retained in the lessor's control, if the lessor
by the exercise of reasonable care
(a) could have discovered the condition and the risk involved
therein, and
(b) could have made the condition safe."
61. Carter v. Carolina Realty Co., 223 N. C. 188, 25 S. E. 2d 553
(1943).
62. Gill Building Co. v. Central Garage Co., 258 Wis. 76, 44 N. W.
2d 905 (1950).
63. Howe v. Howe, 266 App. Div. '799, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 15 (1943).
64. Jones v. Perlstein, 138 Conn. 381, 85 A. 2d 254 (1951) (defective
common hallway); Ball v. Murray, 91 Ga. 686, 86 S. E. 2d 706 (1955)
(defective step in stairway); Nelson v. D'Agastino, 135 Conn. 384, 64
A. 2d 539 (1949) (defective railing on porch). See also the extensive
annotations in 25 A. L. R. 2d 496 (1952); 25 A. L. R. 2d 444 (1952);
25 A. L. R. 2d 364 (1952); 26 A. L. R. 2d 468 (1952); 26 A. L. R. 2d
610 (1952).
65. Germain v. Flick, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 693 (N. Y. 1943) (heating sys-
tem); White v. Kaufman, 131 F. Supp. 213 (E. D. Va. 1954) (boiler
explosion); Garret v. Eugene Med. Center, 190 Ore. 155, 224 P. 2d 563
(1950) (elevator kept in unsafe condition); Gladden v. Walker & Dun-
lop, 168 F. 2d 321 (D. C. Cir. 1948) (electric system). See Annot., 25
A. L. R. 2d 576 (1952).
66. Zito v. Weitz, 62 Cal. App. 2d 161, 144 P. 2d 409 (1944).
67. Armstrong v. Zibell, 98 Cal. App. 2d 296, 219 P. 2d 812 (1950).
68. Bates v. Blitz, 205 La. 536, 17 So. 2d 816 (1944).
69. White v. Thacker, 80 Ga. 656, 80 S. E. 2d 699 (1954); Klahr v.
Kostopoulos, 138 Conn. 653, 88 A. 2d 332.
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some courts to find such control.70 Other courts infer such
control from the fact that the lessor did in fact repair the
defect after the injury for which suit is brought."' Again a
nice question is raised when the lessor hires an independent
contractor to remedy some defect in a part of the premises
over which he has retained control. Does this insulate the
lessor from liability for the contractor's negligence? The
courts have held both ways.
7 2
LESSOR'S FAILURE TO PERFORM AN AGREEMENT TO REPAIR
In this last category, even where the lessor's agreement to
repair is unequivocal in the original contract of the parties,
there is sharp division among the states. Under the older view
the possibility of a recovery in tort based upon breach of a
contractual obligation was denied, the courts saying that tort
damages were either "too remote" or not expectable conse-
quences of such a breach.73 One jurisdiction following this
view has allowed damages in an action for breach of contract
in the amount of medical expenses incurred by the lessee as
a result of injuries sustained by a child of the lessee. 74 How-
ever, the view which has been growing in favor allows the
lessee to recover in tort for injuries caused by the lessor's
failure to perform his agreement. Section 357 of the Restate-
ment of Torts embodies this position' and bases it on the
existence of a "tort duty based on the fact that the contract
70. Antonsen v. Bay Ridge Savings Bank, 292 N. Y. 143, 54 N. E. 2d
338 (1944). Contra Flynn v. Pan American Hotel Co., 143 Tex. 219,
183 S. W. 2d 446 (1944). A typical clause in a lease whereby such "re-
tained control" might be found reads: "The lessor and his representa-
tives shall have the right to enter said premises at any time during rea-
sonable hours to make needed repairs or alterations or to exhibit said
premises."
71. Noble v. Marx, 298 N. Y. 106, 81 N. E. 2d 40 (1948); Guyer v.
Horgan, 96 N. H. 288, 75 A. 2d 325 (1950).
72. Denying insulation for the lessor: Brown v. George Pepperdine
Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 143 P. 2d 929 (1943) ; Hussey v. Long Dock
R. R. Co., 100 N. J. L. 380, 126 Atl. 314 (1924). Granting insulation
for the lessor: Jolly Motor Livery Corp. v. Allenberg, 188 Tenn. App.
452, 221 S. W. 2d 513 (1949)
73. Leavitt v. Twin County Rental Co., 222 N. C. 81, 21 S. E. 2d 890
(1942); Cullings v. Goetz, 231 App. Div. 109, 241 N. Y. S. 109, aff'd,
256 N. Y. 287, 176 N. E. 397 (1931).
74. Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 70 N. E. 2d 418 (1946).
75. The illustration for this section is as follows: "A leases an apart-
ment in a tenement house to B and agrees to keep the tenement in good
internal repair upon notice by the tenant of the necessity of so doing.
B notified A that the ceiling of one of the rooms becomes in need of
repairs. The condition is not such as to threaten an immediate fall of
the ceiling. While B, C, his wife, and D, a friend, are eating supper in
the room, the ceiling falls and causes harm to them. A is liable to B,
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gives the lessor ability to make the repairs and control over
them."70 The New York Court, which rejected the tort lia-
bility founded on the covenant to repair in Cullings v. Goetz,
77
has permitted the jury to find "control" on the basis of the
mere right to enter and repair.78
In most lease forms, (especially where a corporation is the
lessor), there is a covenant exonerating the landlord from any
liability for injury or damage arising out of the condition of
the premises.7 9 However, the reluctance of the courts to ab-
solve the landlord from any such liability is illustrated by the
leading case of Kay v. Cains° where the lease provided that
lessor should not be liable for any damage arising from "any
cause" in or about the building or demised premises whether
caused by or resulting from bursting, leaking or overflowing
of any water or steam pipe or "other cause" whatsoever. The
plaintiff was injured when she fell over a bottle on an uncov-
ered and unlighted stairway at night. The court held that
the quoted phrases did not refer to negligence in failing to
light a public stairway under the principle of ejusdem generis.
But the court went on to say by way of dicta:
Moreover, it is doubtful whether a clause which did un-
dertake to exempt a landlord from responsibility for such
negligence would now be valid. The acute housing short-
age in and near the District of Columbia gives the land-
lord so great a bargaining advantage over the tenant that
such an exemption might well be held invalid on grounds
of public policy.8'
C, and D, if, but only if, the ceiling fell after A has time, subsequent
to receiving B's notice, to make the repairs, had he exercised reasonable
diligence and care." RESTATEMENT, ToRTs sec. 357 at 968 (1934).
76. Id., at 967, Comment a.
77. 231 App. Div. 109, 241 N. Y. S. 109, aff'd, 256 N. Y. 287, 176
N. E. 397 (1931).
73. Noble v. Marx, 298 N. Y. 106, 81 N. E. 2d 40 (1948); Antonsen
v. Bay Ridge Savings Bank, 292 N. Y. 143, 54 N. E. 2d 338 (1944). See
also Note, 48 MICH. L. REV. 689 (1950), which deals with liability in
tort as an incident of occupation and control.
79. An example of the wording of such a covenant: "The Lessee agrees
to hold harmless and protect Lessor against any claims by himself, his
family or the public for damage or injury arising in connection with
the use of the within-demised property during this tenancy."
80. 154 F. 2d 305 (D. C. Cir. 1946).
81. Id., at 306. It is submitted that this dicta, as a holding of law,
would undoubtedly be correct under the circumstances. But with all due
respect and utmost humility, this writer calls to mind the words of the
eminent Professor Corbin concerning public policy: "The loudest and
most confident assertion as to what makes for the general welfare and
happiness of mankind are made by the demagogue and the ignoramus.
[Vol. 10
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THE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA
There is no statutory duty to repair imposed upon the
landlord in South Carolina, and it may be stated generally
that there is no duty upon the landlord to keep the premises
in repair in the absence of an express provision therefor82
Where there is an obligation to repair, a breach by the land-
lord does not give rise to tort liability on behalf of the tenant,
his family, or invitees8 3
The leading case in South Carolina on the question of tort
liability of the landlord for injuries to his tenant arising from
breach of a covenant is Timmons v. Williams Wood Prod-
ucts Corp.84 In that case, the plaintiff, an infant of tender
years, was injured by the falling of a door in the home of
her father which had been rented for himself and family from
defendant. In sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, the
Court held that the landlord is not liable for personal injuries
to the tenant or persons entering under the tenant's title and
that any breach of a covenant to repair gives rise to a cause
of action ex contractu rather than ex delieto, the only dam-
ages recoverable being those reasonably within contemplation
of the parties when the contract was made.85
Criticism has been levelled at this decision s0 on the grounds
that where an injury can reasonably be foreseen if the repair
The wise man knows that he does not know and therefore speaks softly
and less often." 6 CORBIN CONTRACTS, see. 1375 at 450 (1951).
82. Timmons v. Williams Wood Products Corp., 164 S. C. 361, 162
S. E. 329 (1932). But when there are defects of construction amounting
to a nuisance, liability may arise. Id. at 365.
83. Id. at 365. In his excellent opinion for the court, Acting Associate
Justice J. Henry Johnson said by way of dictum at page 374: "Because
the question for determination is one of novel impression in this juris-
diction, this opinion has perhaps been unduly prolonged, but a careful
and exhaustive study convinces us that, with rare exceptions, all of the
cases which permit recovery for personal injuries to the tenant or to a
member of his family are bottomed (1) upon breach of a statutory duty;
(2) where injury results from a defective condition known to the land-
lord and concealed by him from the tenant; (3) where injury is occa-
sioned by a defect in a portion of the premises reserved by the land-
lord for the common use of all his tenants; (4) where injury occurs from
the defective condition of premises furnished by the landlord for use
of the public generally, as theaters, docks, etc.; (5) where the covenant
is to keep the premises safe during the term; or (6) where the lessor
actually undertakes to make the needed repairs and negligently does so
- where there is misfeasance as distinguished from nonfeasance."
84. Ibid. See also Pendarvis v. Wannamaker, 173 S. C. 299, 175 S. E.
531 (1934).
85. Timmons v. Williams Wood Products Corp., 164 S. C. 361, 365,
162 S. E. 329 (1932).
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is not made, the landlord should be responsible therefor so
long as he has covenanted to make the repair 8 7 Nevertheless,
the South Carolina Court suggests the remedy that if the
landlord does not make the repair, the tenant may do so and
recover against the landlord by suffering an action for rent
and counterclaiming for such damages as are ordinarily inci-
dent to a breach of contract.88
Where the tenant can establish negligence as to conditions
within the landlord's control,8 9 or misfeasance,90 damages may
be recovered. But it is no defense to the landlord that others
were joint tort-feasors, if a chain of circumstances put in
motion by the landlord results directly and proximately in a
tenant's injury by reason of his (the landlord's) negligence,
and he is not relieved from liability by such a theory.91
CONCLUSION
It is doubtful whether a majority of the jurisdictions in the
United States adhere to the view that the landlord is not liable
in tort for personal injuries to his tenant.9 2 But those courts
which do hold him liable do so either under the guidance of
statute or by means of the following exceptions to the common
law principle:
1. Fraudulent concealment by the landlord at the time of
leasing;
2. "Misfeasance" (rather than "non-feasance"), in making
repairs;
3. Negligence of the landlord as to the condition of the
premises within his control;
4. The lessor's failure to perform his agreement to repair. 93
In South Carolina, there are no statutes imposing liability
and no duty exists as to repairs by the landlord in the absence
87. Id. at 127.
88. Cantrell v. Fowler, 32 S. C. 589, 10 S. E. 934 (1890).
89. Binnicker v. Adden, 204 S. C. 487, 30 S. E. 2d 142 (1944) (hole in
cement walkway leading to grocery store owned by defendants but leased
to others); Medlock v. McAlister, 120 S. C. 65, 112 S. E. 436 (1922)
(defective elevator, negligently operated).
90. Binnicker v. Adden, Id. at 491; Of. Kilpatrick v. City of Spartan-
burg, 101 S. C. 334, 85 S. E. 775 (1915) (lessors not having directed
the placing of a piece of sidewalk removed from the premises to the
street, they were not liable when tenant's child was injured by the fall-
ing of the piece of sidewalk).
91. Daniels v. Timmons, 216 S. C. 539, 599 S. E. 2d 149 (1950), cert.
denied, Timmons v. Daniels, 340 U. S. 841 (1950).
92. Annot. 163 A. L. R. 300 (1946).
93. See note 20 supra.
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of some express provision to that effect.94 If injuries arise
from breach of such an express provision the only damages
recoverable are those that were reasonably within contempla-
tion of the parties when the contract was entered into.95 The
only other cases allowing recovery are those cases in which
the tenant can establish negligence as to conditions within
the landlord's control96 or misfeasance 7 on his part.
RICHARD T. MAHER, JR.
94. Timmons v. Williams Wood Products Corp., 164 S. C. 361, 162
S. E. 329 (1932).
95. Ibid.
96. See note 89 supra.
97. See note 90 supra.
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